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Reforming WTO Rules on State-Owned 
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Advantages 
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Abstract: State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are pervasive worldwide nowadays, 
particularly in the emerging countries. SOEs are currently more active in global 
markets than decades ago, engaging in cross-border trade and investment. 
Concerns, hence, have arisen, that there are negative effects on global markets 
associated with SOEs usually receiving various advantages, particularly, such 
as financial advantages. Meanwhile, SOEs often act as the givers of financial 
advantages. Current WTO rules are not sufficient to address the problem of 
SOEs as givers of financial advantages, and the problem of SOEs as recipients 
of financial advantages. This article tries to push the current WTO rules to their 
limits, and to find potential approaches to address those problems. The efforts, 
however, failed to some degree. 
Hence, the article makes recommendations to improve them by three types of 
proposals, i.e., trade remedies proposals, trade rules proposals, and a 
competition rules proposal within the framework of the WTO. In the end, the 
author also engages with other academic articles on SOEs, and where they 
support the author’s position or differ from it. Explanations are also given on 
how proposals made by the author are similar to or differ from what was 
proposed in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and why the author’s 
approach is better. 
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State capitalism1 is omnipresent in the global economy.2 There are 
various forms of state capitalism, including state-owned enterprises, 
sovereign wealth funds and so on. This article’s focus, however, is mainly 
government-controlled commercial enterprises (SOEs) that produce goods 
or services.3 Looking at the data and information about SOEs’ number, size, 
value, sector distribution and country distribution, it can be inferred that 
SOEs are pervasive globally, particularly in emerging countries.4 
Nowadays, the model of state capitalism has been embraced by many 
countries, such as China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa.5 SOEs usually 
receive various advantages, which can be categorized into three types, i.e., 
financial advantages; monopolies and exclusive rights, such as production 
permits and quotas; and regulatory and other advantages, such as 
deregulation of SOEs in the fields of environment laws, domestic anti-trust 
laws, bankruptcy laws, etc. SOEs are expanding into global markets 
nowadays by trade and investment.6 SOEs in emerging countries are more 
likely to engage in international trade than SOEs in countries that are 
members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) .7 
Hence, political concerns in relation to SOEs arise frequently.8 
Nevertheless, the economic concerns relating to SOEs merit more attention, 
which is the focus of this article.9 One type of economic concern is that 
giving advantages per se constitutes a concern, and the other is that the 
                                                          
 1 See Ian Bremmer, State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?, 88 
FOREIGN AFF. 3, 40 (2009) (There is an extensive literature that analyses state capitalism). 
 2 Przemyslaw Kowalski et al., State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy 
Implications, 9 (OECD Trade Policy Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 147, 2013). 
 3 See WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHI 26 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995) (There might be some 
deviations across different definitions of SOEs). 
 4 See Grzegorz Kwiatkowski & Pawel Augustynowicz, State-owned Enterprises in the 
Global Economy-Analysis Based on Fortune Global 500 List, in MANAGING INTELLECTUAL 
CAPITAL AND INNOVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE SOCIETY, 27- 29 (2015). 
 5 Carsten Sprenger, The Role of State Owned Enterprises in the Russian Economy, 
(OECD Roundtable on Corporate Governance of SOEs. 2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/
corporategovernanceprinciples/42576825.pdf. 
 6 Max Büge et al., State-owned Enterprises in the Global Economy: Reason for 
Concern?, VOX: CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL, (May 2, 2013), https://voxeu.org/article/state-
owned-enterprises-global-economy-reason-concern. 
 7 Hejing Chen & John Whalley, The State-owned Enterprises Issue in China’s 
Prospective Trade Negotiations, the Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI 
PAPERS NO. 48, 12 (Oct. 2014). 
 8 See Robert Loring Allen, State Trading and Economic Warfare, 24 L. AND CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 256, 259 (1959). 
 9 Id. at 261. For information about impacts of SOEs in trade, see Madanmohan Ghosh 
& John Whalley, State-owned Enterprises, Shirking and Trade Liberalization (NBER 
Working Paper Series, No. 7696. May 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7696. 
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behavior of SOEs to the extent that they receive advantages constitutes a 
concern.10 The first kind of economic concern relates to distortion of global 
markets, contamination of a level playing field and so on. The second 
economic concern relates to the SOEs’ anti-competitive activities like 
avoiding restrictions on below-cost pricing, cross-subsidization, etc.11 SOEs 
are more likely to engage in such anti-competitive behavior after they 
receive advantages.12 The above concerns make sense due to basic 
differences between SOEs and private owned or controlled enterprises 
(POEs). In light of the relationship between SOEs and governments: i) 
SOEs can act as givers of advantages; ii) SOEs receive more advantages on 
more favored terms; iv) the behavior of SOEs after they receive advantages 
is different as opposed to POEs in that SOEs are more likely to pursue 
revenues, rather than profits, and have public objectives in addition to 
commercial objectives, while POEs are more likely to respond to market 
signals. As a consequence, SOEs pose challenges to current WTO rules 
with respect to financial advantages. 
II. WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT WTO RULES ADDRESSING THE 
PROBLEM OF SOES RECEIVING FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES 
Many financial advantages given to SOEs can be regulated by WTO 
rules, such as the Agreement on the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(hereinafter as SCM Agreement). However, there are some specific issues 
concerning advantages given to SOEs that are not effectively covered by 
current WTO rules when they are applied in the context of SOEs. This is 
particularly true in the way in which the SCM Agreement defines certain 
terms relevant to determining the existence of a subsidy. These terms 
include the definitions of “a government or public body” “benefit” and 
“specific”. The article will analyze the following issues, i.e., the problem of 
SOEs giving advantages to others (include both SOEs and POEs)13; the 
problem of SOEs in a downstream industry benefiting from SOEs in the 
upstream industry that receive advantages; and certain problems of SOEs as 
                                                          
 10 Sara Sultan Balbuena, Concerns Related to the Internationalisation of State-Owned 
Enterprises: Perspective from Regulators, Government Owners and the Broader Business 
Community 23-28, (OECD Corporate Governance Working Paper No.19, 2016). 
 11 See Kenneth C. Baseman, Open Entry Costs and Cross-Subsidization in Regulated 
Markets, in GARY FROMM EDS., STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 329-70 (Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press, 1981); Timothy J. Brennan, Cross-Subsidization and Cost Misallocation by 
Regulated Monopolies, J. OF REG. ECON., 37 (March 1990). 
 12 David E. M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Anticompetitive Behavior by State-
Owned Enterprises: Incentives and Capabilities, in COMPETING WITH THE GOVERNMENT, 
ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, EDS., RICHARD R. GEDDES 7-14 
(Hoover Institution Press, 2004). 
 13 In fact, SOEs give more advantages to other SOEs than to POEs; nevertheless, the 
legal analysis is largely the same under the broader problem of SOEs as givers, in spite of 
some variations such as the “one entity approach (recipient approach)” as illustrated in the 
Section B.2 below. 
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receivers of financial advantages. 
A. The Problem of SOEs Giving Advantages to Others 
SOEs give financial advantages to others in terms of capital and 
inputs, such as raw materials, oil, gas, metals, minerals, electricity, water, 
better access to railways, etc. For a subsidy to exist for purposes of the 
SCM Agreement, there must be a financial contribution by a government or 
public body. However, there is no clear answer to the question of whether 
SOEs can be considered to be public bodies and therefore givers of 
subsidies by looking at legal texts of the SCM Agreement. Three 
interpretative approaches may be utilized to address the problem within 
current WTO rules. However, all encounter difficulties. 
1. The “Private Body” (entrust/direct) Approach within the SCM 
Agreement 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement provides that “a subsidy 
shall be deemed to exist if:  (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a 
government or any public body… i.e. where:…(iv) a government makes 
payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to 
carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) 
above”. The “private body” approach within the SCM Agreement treats an 
SOE as a private body “entrusted or directed by a government” to provide a 
financial contribution. Hence, benefits given by SOEs to another entity can 
be challenged as subsidies under the SCM Agreement as long as two 
conditions are met, i) a link of “entrustment or direction” between the 
government and the SOE in question;14 and ii) the SOE is deemed to be a 
private body. 
The First Condition 
The “private body” approach encounters difficulties in satisfying the 
first condition in three senses. First, in WTO jurisprudence, it is 
complicated to prove an “entrustment or direction” link between a 
government and an SOE.15 The Panel in Korea–Commercial Vessels 
rejected the argument that “some degree of government ownership, by 
itself, constitutes proof of government entrustment or direction.”16 In 
essence, a certain degree of compulsion is needed. The mere facts that the 
government is the controller of an entity cannot automatically imply that “a 
                                                          
 14 Ru Ding, ‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 (1) J. OF WORLD 
TRADE 167, 169 (2014). 
 15 WTO Panel Report, United States-Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies 
(US-Export Restraints), WT/DS194/R, ¶¶ 8.29-8.31 (Jun. 29, 2001). 
 16 WTO Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels (Korea-
Commercial Vessels), WT/DS273/R, ¶ 7.406 (Mar.7, 2005) [hereinafter Korea Commercial 
Vessels Panel]. 
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government gives responsibility to,” “a government exercises its authority 
over” or “threat or inducement.” Consequently, neither do those facts imply 
the existence of the link of “entrustment or direction by a government.” 
Second, although the link of “entrustment or direction by a government”, to 
some degree, has been relaxed in US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on 
DRAMs, the typical non-transparent relationship between the government 
and SOEs makes it hard to get evidence of a specific “entrustment and 
direction” in a particular case. 
Third, even if the use of circumstantial evidence is permitted, the 
conclusion is uncertain. On one extreme, there is exclusively private 
conduct, and on the other extreme, there is exclusively governmental 
conduct.17 Somewhere in the middle, there is a mixture such as a situation 
might be found where an SOE engages in behavior deviating from that of 
ordinary market players, such as providing goods or services at lower than 
market prices or on terms unfavorable to itself. It is hard to categorize the 
above situation as exclusively private conduct. One approach adopted by 
the Japanese investigating authority (JIA) in Japan–DRAM (Korea) may 
shed light on the situation. In that case, the factors of “non-commercial 
reasonableness” and “the government’s capacity to influence” are regarded 
as relevant circumstantial evidence to establish government intervention by 
the investigating authority, and the Panel and Appellate Body (AB) didn’t 
reject it.18 The Appellate Body agreed that, at least in principle, government 
pressure on private creditors to restructure their obligations could amount 
to “directing” a private body to engage in a “direct transfer of funds” and 
thus amount to a subsidy.19 In cases of SOEs giving advantages, the factor 
of “non-commercial reasonableness” and pressure from the government 
may be found, as well as other circumstantial evidence as opposed to a case 
involving POEs. For example, state ownership and the dynamics among the 
government, the ruling Party and SOEs, are all relevant circumstantial 
evidence. However, some of these relevant factors have been recognized by 
WTO cases while others have not and the significance of each factor is not 
clear. 
The Second Condition 
Moreover, the phrase “entrusts or directs a private body to carry out” 
in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), clearly requires that the entity that is directed or 
entrusted by a government is a private body. However, it can be disputed 
whether an SOE is “a private body” in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv).20 
                                                          
 17 See AB Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/AB, 
¶ 107 (2005(. 
 18 AB Report, Japan-DRAMs (Korea), WT/DS336/AB/R, ¶¶ 117, 119 and 138 (2007). 
 19 Id. ¶ 123. 
 20 Julien Chaisse & Tsai-yu Lin (eds.), International Economic Law and Governance: 
Essay in HONOUR OF MITSUO MATSUSHITA 243 (2016). 
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From a standpoint of pure logic, a spectrum can be observed from on the 
one extreme, a private body without any state-owned shares, and on the 
other extreme, a government. This spectrum is based on the statement by 
the AB in US–Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) that “the 
term ‘private body’ describes something that is not ‘a government or any 
public body.’”21 The definition of the word “private” includes “of a 
service, business, etc., provided or owned by an individual rather than the 
state or a public body.”22 An inference can be made logically that SOEs are 
somewhere in the middle between the two extremes, or at least SOEs are 
not private bodies. 
In summary, the “private body” approach is not sufficient to address 
the problem of SOEs giving advantages to others, given that the standard 
for satisfying the “entrust/direct” requirement is strict, and state ownership 
or state control of an entity cannot automatically imply the existence of 
“entrustment/direction”, even if relevant circumstantial evidence is taken 
into consideration. In addition, it is hard to argue that SOEs are private 
bodies. 
2. The “Public Body” Approach within the SCM Agreement 
Subsidies granted by SOEs may be subject to the SCM Agreement if it 
can be demonstrated that the SOE at issue is a “public body”, and thereby 
subject to the same rules that restrain a government from granting subsidies. 
The WTO legal texts don’t mention explicitly that SOEs giving advantages 
to others can be covered by the SCM Agreement, and neither do they 
mention whether SOEs can be the givers of subsidies, nor do they give a 
definition of the phrase “a public body”.23 Some authors have examined the 
meaning of the term “public body” from the perspectives of the texts, the 
context and the purpose and the negotiating history of the SCM Agreement, 
and found that object and purpose of the SCM Agreement do not help a lot 
in interpreting the term “public body”, and the negotiating history is too 
ambiguous to rely upon.24 Four legal standards have been presented or 
debated so far in WTO jurisprudence in the determination of what 
constitutes a public body.25 
                                                          
 21 AB Report, United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
WT/DS379/AB/R, ¶ 291 (2011). [hereinafter Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
Appellate Body Report]. 
 22 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/
R, ¶¶ 291-92 (2011). 
 23 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
 24 Id. 
 25 These four standards have been discussed in the following cases: Korea Commercial 
Vessels Panel Report, supra note 16; Panel Report, US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China), WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (adopted Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties Panel Report]; Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
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First, the “government organ/agency” standard, which views a public 
body as functionally equivalent to a government organ or agency, which 
would mean that SOEs are not public bodies, was rejected by panels and the 
AB.26 Second, the “majority ownership” standard, which views a public 
body as an entity that is majority government owned, and hence SOEs are 
public bodies, was rejected by the AB.27 Third, the “government control” 
standard, adopted by two panels, which views SOEs as public bodies since 
they are controlled by the government, was rejected by the AB.28 Finally, 
the “vested governmental authority” standard, which was adopted by the 
AB, views a public body as an entity that possesses, exercises, or is vested 
with governmental authority. The last two standards of “government 
control” and “vested governmental authority” generated much heated 
debate and controversy. However, both standards are limited in their ability 
to address the problem of SOEs giving subsidies to others SOEs as 
analyzed below. 
The “Government Control” Standard 
Although this standard was rejected by the AB, many commentaries 
and people support this standard. Hence, it is worth being discussed here. It 
can be summarized that under the “government control” standard, evidence 
of “majority government ownership” alone is sufficient to satisfy the 
“government control” standard, and hence, to establish the entity in 
question is a public body, unless it can be proved otherwise by the entity 
and the government concerned that the control is absent.29 Nevertheless, the 
Panel that adopted the “government control” standard also considered other 
factors, such as the existence of meaningful control and the nature of the 
entity. In Korea Commercial Vessels, the Panel found that the entity in 
question was a public body primarily based on the evidence that it was 100 
                                                                                                                                      
Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21. Recently cases reaffirm: Panel Report, United 
States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS437/R (adopted July 14, 2014) [hereinafter US—Countervailing Measures (China) 
Panel Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Dec. 18, 2014) 
[hereinafter US—Countervailing Measures (China) AB Report]; Panel Report, United States 
— Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS436/R (adopted July 14, 2014) [hereinafter US—Carbon Steel (India) 
Panel Report]; AB Report, United States — Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB (adopted Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter 
US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report]. 
 26 See Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21, 
¶ 321; Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶¶ 8.55, 8.59. 
 27 See Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21, 
¶ 277. 
 28 Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶ 7.50; Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 8.73. 
 29 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶¶ 8.134-136. 
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percent owned by the government or other public bodies.30 Nevertheless, 
the Panel also stated that the operations of the entity were conducted by 
presidents who were appointed and dismissed by the government, and 
mentioned that the government enjoyed extensive control over the 
parameters within which the entity in question (KEXIM) must operate. The 
Panel found that KEXIM would follow whatever the government directed 
or asked it to do.31 Also, the Panel considered that the “public” nature of 
KEXIM is further confirmed by KEXIM’s own perception of itself.32 
Therefore, the author views that the Panel in this case also considered 
the factor of “meaningful control.” However, the factor of meaningful 
control was regarded as unnecessary, and the factor of “formal (i.e., 
majority voting) control” alone is decisive and sufficient to find the 
existence of a public body.33 In addition, the panel took the view that 
whether “an entity [was] operating on a commercial basis” was not relevant 
for deciding whether the entity was a public body. Rather, whether it 
“operated on a commercial basis” was relevant for the “benefit” analysis in 
the subsidization analysis of the SCM Agreement.34 It also considered the 
“pursuance of public policy objectives” as an unnecessary factor in finding 
a public body.35 
The “Vested Governmental Authority” Standard 
The “vested governmental authority” standard takes the view that the 
relevant factors to establish vested governmental authority include 
ownership, control, meaningful control, appointments of managers in high 
positions, and policy mandates, all of which need to be examined.36 One 
factor is not sufficient and determinative.37 In U.S.–China AC/CVD, the AB 
viewed the factor of “meaningful control” as relevant evidence for 
exercising governmental functions, by stating that “where the evidence 
shows that the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there 
                                                          
 30 Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶ 7.172; 
 31 Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶¶ 7.50-56. 
 32 Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶ 7.50. 
 33 As to the distinction between “formal control” and “meaningful control,” the former 
can be evidenced by majority ownership or majority voting, while the latter means that the 
daily operation of the entity and decision-making of the entity is not independent. For 
instance, under “formal control,” the managers of the entity enjoy large discretion in terms 
of making decisions regarding daily operation of the entity, without much interference from 
the majority owner. The managers or CEO are more likely to be independent and behave like 
professional managers, although their appointments are largely influenced by the majority 
owner. Under “meaningful control,” the shareholders (majority owners) have extensive 
control over the mangers’ decision making in daily operation of the entity. 
 34 Korea Commercial Vessels Panel Report supra note 16, ¶¶ 7.45-7.50. 
 35 Id. ¶7.50. 
 36 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21, ¶¶ 
349-350, 355. 
 37 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶¶ 4.20, 5.37. 
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is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a meaningful way, 
then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity concerned is 
exercising governmental authority.”38 It might be inferred from this AB’s 
statement that evidence of formal control plus meaningful control may 
satisfy the standard of vested authority. However, the case of US–Carbon 
Steel (India) clarifies “meaningful control” and its relative weight. It held 
that “meaningful control” is relevant, but not decisive or exclusive. The 
substantive standard should be distinct from the evidentiary standard.39 The 
AB thinks it is wrong to construe the term “public body” to mean any entity 
that is “meaningfully controlled” by a government.40 In other words, the 
factor of “meaningful control” only has evidential weight, rather than the 
weight of serving as the substantive standard. 
Limitations in the Context of Chinese SOEs 
There are limitations in using these two standards to address the 
problem of SOEs giving financial advantages to others. First, the 
consequences of the “government control” standard may give rise to the 
concern of legal fragmentation at the international level if SOEs are deemed 
to be public bodies under WTO rules while in the international business 
community, it is widely accepted that the behaviors of SOEs, who are doing 
merely commercial activities, or who are merely commercial entities, 
cannot be attributed to the state. In the international investment area, private 
entities can bring investment claims against the host state under bilateral 
investment treaties or free trade agreements, while the state is not allowed 
to bring such claims. In practice, SOEs usually have the standing to bring 
such investment claims. To that end, SOEs are not deemed to be 
governments, and the behavior of SOEs---bringing an investment claim---is 
not attributed to their government. Second, the consequences of the 
“government control” standard may give rise to the concern of legal 
fragmentation at the WTO level. It creates different treatments of SOEs 
within the WTO, i.e., treating SOEs as public bodies in the context of 
subsidies while treating SOEs as non-public bodies in the context of non-
subsidies. 
In contrast, the “vested governmental authority” standard creates 
uncertainty. The answer remains unclear as to the question of whether 
SOEs can be deemed to be public bodies, in that the answer is dependent on 
the evidence found in every case. Only in one case has the AB held that 
state-owned banks (SOBs) are deemed to be public bodies, while the AB in 
the same case decided that other SOEs are not public bodies within the 
                                                          
 38 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Appellate Body Report, supra note 21, ¶ 
318. 
 39 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.37. 
 40 Id. 
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SCM Agreement.41 The AB in US–Carbon Steel (India) held that the 
National Mineral Development Corporation is not a public body within the 
SCM Agreement.42 Furthermore, it seems that the AB doesn’t attach 
different weights to different factors, except for stating that all relevant 
factors shall be examined conjunctively. It provides little guidance for 
practice. For instance, the AB in US–China AD/CVD relied heavily on the 
“meaningful control” factor in finding SOBs as public bodies within the 
SCM Agreement,43 while the AB in US–Carbon Steel (India) clarified that 
the “meaningful control” factor, which is similar to other relevant factors, 
shall not be assigned a decisive weight.44 However, in the latest case of US-
Countervailing Measures (China), the Panel seemed to follow the earlier 
case, noting that the “meaningful control” factor was weighted significantly 
by the AB in US–China AD/CVD.45 It might be better to clarify, at least, the 
weight assigned to each factor. 
Moreover, the AB explained that among other relevant factors to be 
considered are the legal order,46 “. . . economic environment prevailing in 
the country, the scope and content of government policies relating to the 
sector in question, etc.”47 However, the literature and WTO jurisprudence to 
date have not analyzed in detail the specific factors considered by each 
standard, or the extent to which they overlap with one another.48 The 
elements mentioned above are not assigned significant weights except for 
“relevance.” Most cases are brought by a WTO member complaining about 
the countervailing measures imposed on products exported by their SOEs to 
an importing country. Hence, panels evaluate whether the investigating 
authority in the importing country has conducted a thorough examination 
through all relevant factors in determination of whether the SOE in question 
constitutes a public body. In that sense, it remains to be seen whether panels 
in future cases will state that factors like economic environment prevailing 
                                                          
 41 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶¶ 347, 356, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted 
Mar. 11, 2011). 
 42 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶¶ 4.1-4.55. 
 43 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China, supra note 37, ¶ 318. 
 44 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.37. 
 45 US Countervailing Measures (China) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 7.74. 
 46 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.54; US—Carbon Steel 
(India) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 7.66, in which the public body issue was not appealed 
since the panel applied the “vested governmental authority” standard. 
 47 US—Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.29. 
 48 For more debate about whether SOEs are “public bodies” within the SCM 
Agreement, see Ding, supra note 14; Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global 
Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261 (2016). For critics of AB’s standard from the 
perspectives of interpretative method and legal implications, see Michel Cartland, Gerard 
Depayre & Jan Woznowski, Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement? 46 
J. WORLD TRADE 979 (2012). 
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in the country, the scope and content of government policies relating to the 
sector in question, should be examined, or whether panels will further give 
different weights respectively to each factor. 
In the context of Chinese SOEs, many factors seem to be relevant: the 
factor of which industry the SOE is in; the factor of whether there are 
related governmental policies to encourage and support the industry 
concerned; the factor of market structure of the industry and the market 
power enjoyed by the SOE, particularly whether the SOEs benefit from 
monopoly and exclusive rights; the factor of the extent to which various 
advantages are granted to the industry, etc. These factors should play 
significant roles in the determination of whether a Chinese SOE is a public 
body or not, since these factors are typical in the context of Chinese SOEs. 
Taking the factors of the industry an SOE is in and whether the SOE 
has been granted monopolies as an example, except for SOBs which have 
already been found to be public bodies, SOEs in strategic industries, such as 
coal, airline and aviation, telecommunication, petroleum and petrochemical, 
shipping and manufacturing of ships, and electricity, are more likely to 
satisfy both the “government control” standard and “vested governmental 
authority” standard. In contrast, SOEs in pillar industries such as steel, non-
ferrous metal, automotive and auto parts, machinery and equipment, 
information technology, are less likely to satisfy the “vested governmental 
authority” standard, although the “vested governmental authority” standard 
may be satisfied in industries with SOE blocs, such as in the steel, non-
ferrous metals, and automotive industries. One major difference in the 
above two sets of industries lies in the fact whether SOEs have monopolies 
or exclusive rights in the industry they are in respectively, and whether the 
competition is limited in favor of SOEs to the detriment of POEs in terms 
of entry, importation, exportation, distribution, and so on. For instance, in 
cases of China–US AD/CVD and China–US AD,49 the products under 
investigation were petrochemicals, rubber, steel, tires, pipe and tube, woven 
sacks, thermal paper, kitchen appliance, lawn groomers, print graphics, etc., 
produced by SOEs who are in different industries, with different market 
power and different degrees of government support.50 These factors should 
warrant significant considerations and different treatment as to the question 
whether the SOE in question constitutes a public body, but current WTO 
case law does not distinguish them. 
                                                          
 49 Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (adopted Oct. 22, 2010); US 
Countervailing Measures (China) AB Report, supra note 25. 
 50 See Yu Xiangming (于祥明), Yige Hafo Anli De Zaisikao: Zhongguo Shuini Chanye 
Fazhan (一个哈佛案例的再思考：中国水泥产业发展), SHANGHAI SEC. NEWSPAPER, Nov. 
7, 2012, http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/hyyj/20121107/025313597055.shtml. 
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3. The Approach of Regulating the Behavior of SOEs 
The above two approaches of “private body” and “public body” are in 
the context of subsidies within the SCM Agreement. This section discusses 
the approach of regulating the behaviors of SOEs in the context of WTO 
rules generally, and protocols made by Members in particular. Giving 
advantages to others by SOEs can be categorized as one behavior the SOEs 
conduct. Such conduct may give rise to the level of discriminatory behavior 
or decision-making by the SOEs based on non-commercial considerations. 
Hence, the approach of regulating the behaviors of SOEs can address the 
problem of SOEs giving advantages to others, particularly providing goods 
or services at lower prices or on favorable terms. Paragraph b of Article 3 
of China’s Accession Protocol can be resorted to since it provides that the 
prices and availability of goods and services provided by public or state 
enterprises, in areas including transportation, energy, basic 
telecommunications, other utilities and factors of production, should be in 
conformance with the non-discrimination principle.51 A claim under this 
provision needs to be based on differentiated pricing practices. 
However, the specific commitment is only applicable to China. 
Besides, the non-discriminatory obligation only works in domestic markets. 
Moreover, this particular rule only works in one segment of the domestic 
market where FOEs are present. In other words, it only works in a situation 
where SOEs give advantages to others who are in competition with FOEs 
(foreign individuals and enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises) that 
produce goods or services in China. In practice, there are few FOEs in the 
Chinese domestic market in the abovementioned segments. It doesn’t work 
in situations where SOEs give advantages to other SOEs who are in 
competition with imported goods, or where SOEs give advantages to other 
SOEs who export goods or services to importing markets. What’s worse, 
WTO rules currently do not regulate the behavior of SOEs in general, let 
alone the obligation of commercial considerations for SOEs, except for 
those SOEs with exclusive trading rights. 
4. Conclusion of Section A 
In summary, the problem of SOEs giving advantages to other SOEs is 
not sufficiently addressed by the current WTO rules in that the “private 
body” approach within the SCM Agreement faces difficulty in proving the 
link of entrustment or direction between the government and the SOE in a 
particular case, and in proving that SOEs are private bodies. The “public 
body” approach also fails in that the legal standards and evidential factors 
for the question of what constitutes a public body have limitations in WTO 
jurisprudence. Particularly in the context of Chinese SOEs, insufficient 
attention is given to the factors of which industry the SOE is in and of 
                                                          
 51 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 
Nov. 2001, art. 3. 
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whether the SOE has been granted monopolies or exclusive rights, and 
other factors that are typical in the context of Chinese SOEs. The behavior 
approach also failed in the sense that the specific commitment made by 
China only applies partially to the situation where SOEs give advantages to 
other SOEs. The WTO rules, in general, do not regulate the behavior of 
SOEs directly. 
B. The Problem of Upstream Subsidies in the Context of Chinese SOEs 
Input subsidies and upstream subsidies refer to subsidies granted to an 
input purchased by the downstream industry, which is in competition with 
imports or which exports to foreign markets.52 There are four situations of 
concern to my analysis, i.e., situation 1 is where SOEs dominate both the 
upstream and the downstream industries; situation 2 where POEs dominate 
the upstream industry and SOEs dominate the downstream industry; 
situation 3 where SOEs dominate the upstream industry and POEs dominate 
the downstream industry; and situation 4 where POEs dominate both the 
upstream and the downstream industries. Typically, when most literature 
discusses whether upstream subsidies can be deemed to be subsidies for the 
downstream industry and analyzes the difficulties encountered under the 
SCM Agreement, it is done in the context of situation 4. 
Situations 1, 2, and 3 are worthy of attention. They arise when SOEs 
are either the major player in the upstream industry or the downstream 
industry or both. Particularly in situation 1, for instance, in the context of 
Chinese SOEs, the coal industry is the upstream industry in relation to the 
steel industry, in which SOEs are the major players in China.53 Actually, the 
steel industry receives advantages of three types: i) SOEs in the coal 
industry receive advantages from having better access to railways for 
transporting coal used for generating electricity, and the steel industry gets 
better deals from the electricity companies for purchasing electricity in 
large quantities directly rather than purchasing on-grid electricity; ii) SOEs 
in the coal industry receive advantages from having better access to 
railways for transporting coal used for producing steel; and iii) the coal 
industry also gets compensation specifically for supporting the steel 
industry by providing coal at lower prices. Examples can be found in 
Pinding Shan Tian AN Coal Ltd. (an SOE).54 This situation is also typical 
                                                          
 52 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JOANNA SHELTON-ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE (The MIT Press, 1984). 
 53 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, State Enterprises in the 
Steel Sector, Directorate For Science, Technology and Innovation Steel Committee, 
DSTI/SC(2017)10/FINAL, Dec. 20, 2018, ¶¶ 14-9. http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DSTI/SC(2017)10/FINAL&docLanguage=En 
 54 The example of Pingding Shang Tian An Coal Ltd receiving compensation for 
providing lower prices of coal can be found in its annual financial reports (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange) from 2008-2014, which can be found at http://english.sse.com.cn/listed/
company/cannouncements/index.shtml?COMPANY_CODE=601666 
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in industries of chemicals, petrochemicals, and aluminum. Four approaches 
may be put forward to address this situation through current rules. 
Nonetheless, all of them encounter difficulties in the context of Chinese 
SOEs. 
1. The Subject Approach 
The subject approach treats the upstream SOEs as public bodies, who 
are givers of subsidies through the provision of goods or services. This 
approach can apply to situation 1 and 3. However, the difficulty of the 
approach has been discussed in the section above. 
2. The Recipient Approach 
The recipient approach is to treat the upstream SOEs and downstream 
SOEs as related entities as if they were part of one group of related 
companies. In such a case, both the upstream and downstream SOEs are 
viewed as direct recipients of the subsidies. The Panel in US-Softwood 
Lumber III concluded that where there is “complete identity between the 
tenure holder/logger and the lumber producer, no pass-through analysis is 
required.”55 In United States–Softwood Lumber IV, it was held that if two 
industries operate at arm’s length, a “benefit pass-through” analysis is 
needed.56 It can be inferred that if the two producers do not operate at arm’s 
length or if there is complete identity between the two producers, a “benefit 
pass-through” analysis is not necessary since these two producers can be 
deemed to be one. In that sense, the producers of the processed products are 
also direct recipients of subsidies. 
The same logic can be applied to the case of SOEs to examine whether 
SOEs in the upstream industry and downstream industry are related or not. 
It can be argued that the state is the major shareholder or controller of the 
two SOEs, and hence, SOEs in the upstream industry and downstream 
industry can be treated as related entities or their transactions can be viewed 
as not at arm’s length in this regard. Furthermore, from the perspective of 
accountancy, there might be one financial report for the whole corporate 
group. This argument works well especially in a situation where the parent 
SOE is subsidized for its products, which are inputs for subsidiary SOEs, 
who produce the processed products. For instance, in natural resources 
industries, vertical integration is common in China. The SOE in the 
exploration sector is usually a sibling of an SOE in the processing sector. 
To that end, the upstream subsidies can be deemed to be subsidies for the 
downstream industry. Subsidization of inputs, produced by the upstream 
SOEs, can be deemed to be subsidization of the final product, produced by 
                                                          
 55 Panel Report, United States — Sections 7.72, 7.74 of the Softwood Lumber III, WTC 
Doc. WT/DS236/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2002). 
 56 Appellate Body Report, United States –Softwood Lumber IV, ¶¶ 152-66, WTC Doc. 
WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2004). 
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the downstream SOEs. 
However, opposing arguments exist that the key test for whether two 
entities are related or not lies in whether the transaction in question is 
conducted at arm’s length. It is not reasonable to treat all sibling SOEs as 
one entity ignoring the nature of transactions in practice. In addition, from a 
business viewpoint, it may be difficult to demonstrate that SOEs in the 
upstream industry and SOEs in the downstream industry are in one group, 
particularly if they operate in different industries, produce different 
products, keep separate accounts and so on. 
3. The Approach of “Benefits Pass-Through” 
The analysis of “benefits pass-through” examines “whether 
subsidization of the upstream industry results in the provision of inputs by 
the upstream industry at a cheaper price than the price prevailing on world 
markets.”57 In the context of SOEs in the similar situation of subsidized 
inputs, the “benefits pass-through” analysis is needed to prove that there are 
benefits flowing from the upstream industry to the downstream industry, 
evidenced by, for instance, low pricing of goods or services provided by the 
upstream SOEs to the downstream SOEs. If the upstream subsidies 
(provided to coal industry) led to prices of coal lower than the normal 
market prices in China than world prices, a potential subsidy might exist 
with respect to the downstream industry such as the steel industry. 
Taking the steel industry as an example, first, SOEs in the coal 
industry receive advantages from railways (all are SOEs) in having better 
access to railways for transporting their coal designated for generating 
electricity, and prices of coal sold to electricity companies (almost all are 
SOEs) are lower than the prices when coal is sold to other sectors. The steel 
companies usually approach electricity companies for lower priced 
electricity. Second, SOEs in the coal industry also receive advantages from 
railways (SOEs) in having better access to railways for transporting their 
coal designated for producing steel. Third, in some cases, the coal industry 
receives subsidies specifying that it is compensation for providing coal at 
lower prices to the steel industry.58 Hence, the government imposes 
conditions on the subsidized industry (the majority of which are SOEs) and 
requires them to sell at lower prices to the downstream industry (the 
majority of which are SOEs). The consequence is that the steel industry 
benefits from lower cost coal, electricity and transportation. 
As a practical matter, it be may difficult to show that benefits flow 
                                                          
 57 Panel Report, United States — Section 7.71 of the Softwood Lumber III, WTC Doc. 
WT/DS236/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2002); WILLIAM R. CLINE (ED.), TRADE POLICY IN THE 
1980S 352-3 (MIT Press, 1st ed. 1983). 
 58 Usually the title of subsidies granted in this regard specifically state that the subsidies 
are for compensating the coal industry for their encouraging and supporting the steel 
industry. 
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from the upstream sector to the downstream sector through lower pricing. 
Due to the transparency problem, it is hard to find whether there are explicit 
governmental policies by different levels of authorities. In addition, it is 
difficult to prove that inputs are provided at cheaper prices than the prices 
prevailing on world markets or prices under market conditions. 
4. The Approach of Channeling Through “Income or Price Support” 
The last approach is related to a specific situation where subsidies are 
granted to the upstream SOEs for the purpose of maintaining prices in the 
domestic market. This situation may involve “income or price support” 
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement, which 
provides that “a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if there is any form of 
income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT 1994”. 
Subsidies to the upstream SOEs can be viewed in totality as a scheme of 
income support, for instance, which leads to lower prices of coal/energy for 
the steel industry. However, while this GATT provision was incorporated 
into the SCM Agreement, it is mainly of historical interest, cases today are 
normally brought under the more detailed provisions of the SCM 
Agreement.59
 
5. Conclusion of Section B 
As for the problem of SOEs in the downstream industry which benefit 
from transactions with subsidized SOEs in the upstream industry, the 
various approaches that are available within the current WTO rules are all 
inadequate. In respect of the subject approach, it may be easy to find some 
SOEs are public bodies while it is hard to conclude the same for other SOEs 
depending on the industry/sector they are in and the nature of the SOE. In 
respect of the recipient approach, it is hard to treat two separate SOEs in the 
upstream and downstream sectors as one group of related companies 
although some arguments can be made. In respect of the “benefits pass-
through” approach, it is difficult to find evidence of lowering prices. The 
approach of “price or income support” is mainly of historical interest. 
C. The Problem of Chinese SOEs as Receivers of Financial Advantages 
1. SOEs Receive Financial Advantages Prior to Their Privatization 
In a situation where a POE receive financial advantages and 
shareholders of the POE changed afterward, no controversy would arise 
whether financial advantages received previously would be affected by the 
change of shareholders. However, the analysis may be different if the 
change of shareholders is privatization. For instance, Chinese SOEs receive 
                                                          
 59 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article XVI, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
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financial advantages prior to privatizations. After privatization, some of 
these entities continue to engage in international markets. Problems arise if 
benefits from subsidies granted to SOEs prior to privatization continue to 
exist, and hence, the entity after privatization will have comparative 
advantages over its competitors. 
The WTO rules in this regard are confusing. In the early cases of US–
Lead and Bismuth II 60 and US–Countervailing Measures on Certain EC 
Products, it was held that a full privatization at arm’s length and for fair 
market value of an SOE that received prior subsidies can give rise to a 
rebuttable presumption that the benefit conferred by prior subsidies is 
extinguished.61 However, in EC–Civil Aircraft, which concerns partial 
privatization, the AB divided in three ways. i) One position is that the 
presumption of extinction only applies to full privatization, rather than 
partial privatizations or private-to-private sales; ii) The second position 
views that the presumption rule also applies to partial privatization and 
private-to-private sales. Nevertheless, this position noted the issue of a 
transfer of control to the new owners; iii) The third position is that in a sale 
of shares, regardless whether there is a transfer of control or not, the value 
of assets of the company, to which the shares attach, does not change at all, 
including the benefit of any subsidy granted, which continues to benefit the 
recipient.62 
Hence, as for the privatizations with a transfer of control, the 
uncertainty continues in respect of whether benefits of the subsidies would 
be extinguished under the three positions. To that end, the legal problem 
remains that in cases of partial privatization of Chinese SOEs when there is 
a transfer of control, it is not clear whether subsidies received prior to 
privatization can still be subject to the SCM Agreement given that it is not 
clear based on current jurisprudence whether the legal element of “benefit” 
as required under the SCM Agreement can be established or not. 
2. The Element of “Benchmark Prices” 
In order to find whether there is a subsidy, a benchmark is needed to 
examine whether benefits are given to recipients that are otherwise not 
                                                          
 60 Appellate Body Report, United States —of the Imposition of Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United 
Kingdom (US – Lead and Bismuth II), WTC Doc. WT/DS138/AB/R (adopted May 10, 
2000), ¶ 68.   
 61 Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Measures Concerning 
Certain Products from the European Communities (US – Countervailing Measures on 
Certain EC Products), ¶117, WTC Doc. WT/DS212/AB/R (adopted Dec. 9, 2002); Panel 
Report, European Communities — Section 7.248 of the Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft), WTC Doc. 
WT/DS316/R (adopted June 30, 2010). 
 62 US-Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, supra note 61, ¶¶ 730-2. 
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available under market conditions.63 In cases of SOEs receiving advantages, 
the market in which SOEs operate may be distorted, particularly where 
SOEs are monopolists or dominate the market. How is the factor, for 
instance, that the state dominates the sector through SOEs, relevant in 
finding that Chinese prices, in general, do not “permit a proper 
comparison”?64 
The current standard for using an alternative benefit benchmark is 
relatively strict. Article 15(b) of China’s Accession Protocol, which does 
not have an expiration date, allows choosing a different benchmark if 
market economy conditions are not prevailing or the possibility that 
prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be available as 
appropriate benchmarks.65 However, the burden of proof is on the 
importing country to explain the choice of a different benchmark. First, the 
standard focuses on the outcome, i.e., whether the proposed benchmark is 
market-determined, rather than a function of the source of the price.66 
Second, it was held in US Countervailing Measures (China) that there is no 
per se rule that the fact the government is the predominant supplier proves 
price distortion.67 “Evidence relating to government ownership of SOEs and 
its respective market shares does not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient 
basis for concluding that in-country prices are distorted.”68 Finally, factors 
relating to the structure of relevant market, whether the market is dominated 
by the state, SOEs’ respective market shares, whether systematic subsidies 
are associated with the market, etc., are only deemed to be relevant factors, 
rather than decisive factors, in finding whether the government influences 
the pricing conduct of SOEs.69 
In sum, in cases of SOEs receiving advantages, although the market in 
which SOEs operate may be distorted, particularly where SOEs are 
monopolists or dominate the market, it is usually difficult to find the 
existence of benefits, which is a legal element of establishing the existence 
of subsidies subject to the SCM Agreement. Although current rules allow 
choosing a different benchmark in identifying benefits subject to certain 
conditions, the mere status of SOEs’ dominance in one industry cannot 
automatically imply the price distortion which warrants an alternative 
benchmark. 
                                                          
 63 Art. 1.1(b) and 14 of the SCM Agreement. 
 64 Mark Wu, The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L 
L. J. 261 (2016). 
 65 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 
Nov. 2001, art. 15 (b) and (d). 
 66 US—Carbon Steel (India) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.154. 
 67 US Countervailing Measures (China) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.51. 
 68 Id. ¶ 4.62. 
 69 Id. ¶ 4.62. 
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3. The Element of “Specificity” 
The above problems primarily cast challenges to whether the measure 
in question constitutes a subsidy. In addition, the SCM Agreement requires 
that an actionable subsidy must be specific.70 In the context of China, 
however, it is hard to prove “specificity” either as “industry specificity” or 
“enterprise specificity.” 
First, various SOEs that dominate in many industries receive financial 
advantages. In practice, policies adopted by the Chinese government 
usually identify strategic industries and pillar industries and provide 
guidelines to favor these industries, in which SOEs dominate. However, 
due to the non-transparency, details of how this favoritism is implemented 
may be difficult to find, such as through granting specific financial 
advantages. Thus, policies and guidelines that specify certain industries as 
favored industries cannot be used per se to establish “industry specificity” 
in making subsidies subject to the SCM Agreement. Second, the recipients 
of advantages are largely SOEs even if the conditions for receiving 
advantages are neutral in their face. China’s commitments in its accession 
to the WTO include a special rule of specificity in relation to SOEs,71 i.e., 
subsidies provided to SOEs will be viewed as specific if SOEs are the 
predominant recipients of such subsidies or if SOEs receive 
disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies. However, there have 
been no WTO cases resorting to this special rule so far. The reason might 
be evidentiary difficulties in finding information showing that SOEs are 
predominant recipients of the subsidies at issue or that SOEs receive 
disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies. The “specificity” rule 
focuses on the outcome of a subsidy, rather than the status of the recipients 
in markets. Thus, it is hard to prove “enterprise specificity.” 
In sum, it is difficult to satisfy the legal elements of “specificity” in 
cases of Chinese SOEs receiving advantages, given that information in this 
regard is scarce in terms of finding either “industry specific” or “enterprise 
specific.” 
D. Summary of Section II 
In summary, this section examined the deficiencies of current WTO 
rules in regulating financial advantages in the context of SOEs. First, the 
problem of SOEs giving advantages to others is not sufficiently addressed 
by the current WTO rules neither through the “private body” approach, the 
“public body” approach, nor the behavior rules within the WTO. Second, as 
for the problem of SOEs in the downstream industry which benefit from 
transactions with subsidized SOEs in the upstream industry, various 
approaches are all inadequate. Third, in respect of SOEs as recipients of 
                                                          
 70 Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. 
 71 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 
2001, para.10.2 of Part I. 
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financial advantages, the privatizations of SOEs with a transfer of control 
may raise uncertainty with respect to whether subsidies received prior to 
privatization can still be subject to the SCM Agreement. Also, in cases of 
SOEs receiving advantages, it is usually difficult to find the existence of 
benefits, which is one legal element in establishing the existence of a 
subsidy if the benchmark is the market where SOEs dominate, since current 
WTO jurisdiction holds that the mere status of SOEs’ dominance in one 
industry or market cannot automatically imply price distortion which 
warrants an alternative benchmark. Finally, it is difficult to satisfy the legal 
element of “specificity” in cases of SOEs receiving advantages due to the 
transparency issue. 
III. PROPOSALS TO THE WTO RULES TO ADDRESS THE 
PROBLEMS 
The author makes proposals to address the deficiencies in WTO rules 
regarding SOEs giving financial advantages to others and SOEs receiving 
advantages. The proposals are divided into three groups, (i) proposals 
relating to improving WTO trade remedies; (ii) proposals relating to 
improving WTO trade rules generally; and (iii) proposals for adding 
competition rules to the WTO Agreement. A combination will be 
introduced in order to solve all problems. 
A. Trade Remedies Proposals 
1. Proposals to Solve the Problem of SOEs as Givers 
The trade remedies proposals are focused on changes to the SCM 
Agreement in order to ensure that financial advantages received by or 
granted to SOEs are adequately controlled. The author would not propose to 
substantively change the definition of “entrust/direct” to mean that “state 
control can automatically imply the existence of entrustment or direction” 
since there may be situations of facial control where controllers do not 
interfere with the daily operation of the entity. Instead, the author proposes 
to change the interpretation of the SCM Agreement, referring to as “the 
public body presumption proposal.” It proposes that entities under the 
meaningful control of the government with monopolistic or dominant 
market power can be presumptively deemed to be public bodies unless 
evidence to the contrary is put forth by the responding party with regard to 
the entity in question. The presumption of “public body” status of SOEs 
based on control and market status, places the burden of proof on the 
Member who has the SOE to demonstrate either that “meaningful control” 
is not present in a sense that the government is not in actual control of daily 
operations, and that the decision-making of the SOE is independent, or that 
the SOE in question do not enjoy monopolistic or dominant market power 
out of favor from governments. If these can be proved, the presumption is 
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rebutted. 
Possibility of Realizing the Proposal 
The proposal has the potential to be realized in practice. First, the AB 
states that its view on “public body” comes from the analysis of text, 
context, object or purpose, and that its interpretation merely “coincides” 
with “the essence of Article 5 of the ILCDAs,” which provides that “[t]he 
conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 
4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of 
the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in 
the particular instance.”72 It might be interpreted that SOEs that have been 
granted monopolies or exclusive rights are entities empowered by the state 
to exercise elements of the governmental authority given that most 
monopolies or exclusive rights are granted out of public interest, or at least 
governments so allege. 
Second, the factor “meaningful control” does not go too far away from 
the latest jurisprudence and would not raise too much controversy. The AB 
in US-Carbon Steel (India) clarified that the “meaningful control” factor 
shall not be assigned a decisive weight compared to other relevant factors.73 
In the latest case of US-Countervailing Measures (China), the Panel 
seemed to view that the “meaningful control” factor was weighted 
significantly by the AB in US-China AD/CVD.74 The Panel did not question 
the U.S.’ interpretation that “public body” can mean an entity that is 
controlled by a government such that the government can use the resources 
of that entity as its own, citing the concept of “meaningful control” relied 
upon by the Appellate Body in US-China AC/CVD. The Panel in US-
Countervailing Measures (China) found that the U.S. investigative 
authority did not apply their alleged “meaningful control” standard in the 
investigated case at hand even assuming that the alleged standard is the 
right interpretation of the term “public body.” To that end, it can be inferred 
that the Panel did not follow the AB explicitly to denounce the 
interpretation that “meaningful control” is a decisive factor in interpreting 
the term “public body,” which the AB has clearly denounced in US-Carbon 
Steel (India). The panel’s attitude towards the significance of the factor 
“meaningful control” in the interpretation of the term “public body” seems 
different from that of the AB. Although the AB’s view is more 
authoritative, the contradiction between the AB and panels may open the 
                                                          
 72 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (Jul. 26, 2001), art. 8; 
Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre & Jan Woznowskl, Is Something Going Wrong in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 996-1001 (2012), 997. 
 73 US—Carbon Steel (India) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.37. 
 74 US Countervailing Measures (China) Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 7.74. 
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door for my proposal in the future. 
Third, the factor relating to “market status” would not go much away 
from the AB’s interpretation. The AB mentioned that relevant factors may 
play different roles in different cases, such as the factor of market power 
and the industry in which the entity is. The AB explained that “whether the 
conduct of an entity is that of a public body must in each case be 
determined on its own merits, with due regard to the core characteristics 
and functions of the relevant entity, its relationship with the government, 
and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which 
the investigated entity operates75 . . . Evidence regarding the scope and 
content of government policies relating to the sector in which the 
investigated entity operates may inform the question of whether the conduct 
of an entity is that of a public body.”76 Hence, the factor of whether the 
SOE enjoys monopolistic/dominant market positions out of receiving 
various advantages from the government could be a relevant factor. 
Problems Solved by this Proposal 
The proposal can solve the problem of SOEs giving financial 
advantages to others, and the problem of upstream subsidies in the situation 
of SOEs from a legal viewpoint. One major reason that these two problems 
may escape the discipline of the SCM Agreement lies in that SOEs that are 
givers of advantages cannot fit into the categories of “governments” or 
“public body” captured by the SCM Agreement, and hence, it cannot be 
established that there is a subsidy given by a government or public body. 
By treating SOEs who are under the government’s meaningful control and 
are given monopolies or exclusive rights or dominant positions as public 
bodies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, the proposal expands 
the reach of SCM Agreement to many cases where SOEs give advantages 
to others, and where SOEs receive upstream subsidies and give advantages 
to downstream industries. The proposal makes it possible to establish there 
is a subsidy in these two situations and makes them subject to the discipline 
of SCM Agreement by focusing on the nature of SOEs as givers of 
advantages as a subject matter. 
The proposal can solve the two problems largely from a practical 
viewpoint. First, the emphasis on the factor of whether the SOE enjoys 
monopolistic or dominant market positions out of receiving various 
advantages from governments has economic grounds. If SOEs are in 
dominant positions in a specific industry or market, with no or little 
competition from POEs, these SOEs could provide goods or services lower 
than the world prices. If SOEs were not in dominant positions in a specific 
industry, their provision of goods or service at prices lower than the world 
prices would not affect the market too much since POEs can compete with 
                                                          
 75 US — Carbon Steel (India) AB Report, supra note 25, ¶ 4.29. 
 76 Id. 
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them in the market. To that end, whether SOEs have monopolies or 
exclusive rights in the industry can be the standard for the typology of 
SOEs. For instance, SOEs in energy producing sectors may provide energy 
at prices below market rates to SOEs in other sectors. This proposal directly 
responds to the problem of productive inputs provided by SOEs to other 
SOEs. 
Second, the presumption of SOEs under meaningful control of the 
government and with monopolistic or dominant market power as public 
bodies, fits into the reality of China and can well handle the problems at 
issue. For instance, Chinese SOEs in strategic industries, such as coal, 
airline and aviation, telecommunication, petroleum and petrochemical, 
shipping and manufacturing of ships, and electricity, enjoy monopolies or 
dominant market power due to statutory grants or governmental measures 
limiting competition in the favor of these SOEs. The Chinese Government 
usually maintains state ownership in absolute control of strategic industries 
with the purpose of “protecting public interest, national interest, and 
security interest”. It fits into the “public body” discussion insofar the stress 
is all on the public interest. The proposal takes into consideration that it is 
difficult to gather evidence regarding SOEs due to their non-transparency. 
The proposal is more likely to motivate China to move toward a direction 
that could produce evidence about Chinse SOEs not being meaningfully 
controlled by the government or reducing the predominant status of SOEs 
in strategic industries particularly. Hence, China may have the motive to 
reduce or eliminate the actual control over daily operation and management 
of SOEs, and the decision-making of SOEs may become independent and 
be commercially based, on the one hand, and to increase competition in 
strategic or pillar industries, on the other hand. 
2. Proposals to Solve the Problem of SOEs as Receivers 
Privatization 
In cases of SOEs that had received financial advantages being partial 
privatized afterwards with a transfer of control to private entities, it remains 
unclear whether subsidies received prior to privatization can still be subject 
to the SCM Agreement. It is due to the fact that current jurisprudence is not 
clear whether the legal element of “benefit” as required under the SCM 
Agreement would be extinguished or not. The author proposes to treat the 
benefits obtained prior to privatization as not extinguished even if the 
privatization is at arm’s length and for fair-market value, given that 
competitive advantages still remain. 
Benchmark 
In cases of SOEs receiving advantages, although the market in which 
SOEs operate may be distorted, particularly where SOEs are monopolists or 
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dominate the market, it is usually difficult to find the existence of benefits, 
which is a legal element of establishing the existence of subsidies subject to 
the SCM Agreement. Although current rules allow choosing a different 
benchmark, the mere status of SOEs’ dominance in one industry cannot 
automatically imply there is price distortion which warrants an alternative 
benchmark. 
The author proposes to have a presumptive rule regarding benchmarks, 
which can be applied in cases of SOEs receiving advantages where the 
SOEs are monopolists or dominant players.77 In other words, it is refutably 
presumed that the fact that the government/SOEs is/are the predominant 
supplier(s) establishes that there is price distortion. For instance, selecting a 
different benchmark is allowed in the case of Chinese SOEs who are 
dominant in the industry in question. Instead of focusing on the 
consequences of SOEs receiving advantages, such as whether the price is 
market-determined, the proposal focuses on the market structure, whether it 
is dominated by the state or SOEs, whether there are systematic subsidies 
granted in association with the market, etc. Combining these factors 
together can be indicative of whether they lead inevitably to distortion of 
prices by making presumptive inference from status, without demonstrating 
the consequences in fact. This proposal’s rationale is based in part on the 
underlying evidentiary problems given that information about all the factors 
listed above may not be available in China. Hence, all factors are relevant 
and the rebuttable presumption can be made based on several of these 
factors. 
Specificity 
One additional problem in disciplining SOEs receiving financial 
advantages lies in the difficulty in establishing the legal requirement that an 
actionable subsidy must be specific.78 Despite China’s commitments in its 
accession to the WTO that subsidies provided to SOEs will be viewed as 
specific if SOEs are the predominant recipients of such subsidies or SOEs 
receive disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies,79 it is hard to 
find evidence regarding the outcome of a subsidy in terms of recipients. 
The author proposes, instead of focusing on the outcome of a subsidy, 
to focus on the market power of recipients (SOEs) in question, i.e., whether 
they are monopolistic or dominant in the industry, or enjoy exclusive rights 
to the exclusion of POEs, in finding the legal element of “specificity”. This 
proposal comes with a rebuttable presumption rule that financial advantages 
granted to those SOEs are deemed to be specific unless evidence to the 
                                                          
 77 JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 84-87 (1990). 
 78 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 2, 1869, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 
 79 World Trade Organization, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Part I, 
¶.10.2, December 11, 2001. 
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contrary can be proved. The proposal makes sense from economic and 
historical viewpoints. In the view of economists, the requirement of 
specificity cannot be explained by any economic rationale.80 Specificity 
was not necessarily required by the 1979 Tokyo Round Subsidies Code.81 
Specificity is more of an administrative tool, and it embraces the “de facto” 
test.82 It is due to an administrative contingency and judicial economy, as 
well as the balance between the imposition of CVDs and grants of 
subsidies, that specificity is required in the SCM Agreement. The 
specificity test is a flexible test. For instance, it is more about legal 
technicalities that specificity is deemed to exist for export subsidies. Such 
flexibility and legal technicalities can be applied in cases involving giving 
advantages to SOEs, who are monopolistic or dominant in the industry, or 
enjoy exclusive rights to the exclusion of POEs. 
Such a proposal can partially contribute to the solution of the problem 
of granting financial advantages to industries which are dominated by 
SOEs. To find evidence of market status is easier than finding out precisely 
who receives subsidies and how much they receive. 
B. Trade Rules Proposals 
The author proposes to expand the coverage of GATT Article XVII to 
all SOEs with all kinds of monopolies and exclusive rights, and hence the 
obligation of making decisions solely based on commercial considerations 
in GATT Article XVII:1(b) can be applied to all SOEs with different kinds 
of monopolies or exclusive rights. Furthermore, Article XVII:1(b) should 
be revised to make it independent from Article XVII:1(a). To that end, 
SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights would be 
obligated not to give financial advantages to other SOEs. This proposal can 
solve the problem of SOEs giving financial advantages to other entities. 
Requiring those SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or exclusive 
rights to make decisions solely based on commercial considerations would 
largely preclude them from giving financial advantages to other entities. 
However, this proposal can’t solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial 
advantages. 
C. Competition Rules Proposal 
The author proposes to prohibit SOEs from giving financial 
advantages to others, particularly SOEs, to the extent that such behavior 
affects or distorts competition. The proposal has competition rules 
                                                          
 80 See Merit E. Janow & Robert W. Staiger, US–Export Restraints: United States–
Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 201 (2003). 
 81 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT 181 (1979). 
 82 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
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elements, and hence, is called a competition rules proposal. More 
specifically, the author would add to the WTO a provision such as Article 
17.6 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which provides: 
Each Party shall ensure that its state enterprises and state-owned 
enterprises do not cause adverse effects to the interests of another 
Party [nor distort or threaten competition] through the use of non-
commercial assistance that the state enterprise or state-owned 
enterprise provides to any of its state-owned enterprises with respect 
to: 
(a) the production and sale of a good by the state-owned enterprise; 
(b) the supply of a service by the state-owned enterprise from the 
territory of the Party into the territory of another Party; or 
(c) the supply of a service in the territory of another Party through an 
enterprise that is a covered investment in the territory of that other 
Party or any other Party.83 
The bracketed language is not in the TPP provision, but it would be useful 
to add such bracketed language as wording “nor distort or threaten 
competition.” The bracketed language was inspired by the EU rules in that 
they regulate state aid within the competition rules framework to the extent 
that state aid threatens the goal of “a single market” pursued by European 
countries in the process of integration.84 It regulates state aid that distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods.85 The phrase “distort or threaten competition” 
in the bracket is not exactly the same as “cause adverse effects to another 
state’s interests”. The phrase “distort or threaten competition” adds 
something new. There might be a situation where the welfare of the 
subsidizing country decreases while the other countries’ welfare may not 
decrease. This situation, while not covered by the phrase “cause adverse 
effects to another state’s interests,” can be captured by the phrase “distort or 
threaten competition”. This proposal can solve the problem of SOEs giving 
financial advantages to others since it captures all SOEs in areas of trade of 
goods or services domestic and overseas. However, this proposal can’t 
solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial advantages. 
D. Combination of Proposals 
From examining the proposals above, problems identified can be 
                                                          
 83 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 17.6(2), Feb. 4, 2016. 
 84 GEORGE BERMANN, ROGER GOEBEL, WILLIAM DAVEY AND ELEANOR FOX, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 1043-33 (3rd ed. 2010). 
 85 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, art. 
107.1, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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largely solved through three ways. One is through the trade remedies 
proposals alone, i.e., proposals regarding a public body to solve the 
problem of SOEs giving financial advantages, and proposals regarding 
privatization, benchmark, and specificity to solve the problem of SOEs 
giving financial advantages. The second way is through the combination of 
the trade remedies proposals, i.e., proposals regarding privatization, 
benchmark and specificity to solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial 
advantages, and the trade rules proposals to solve the problem of SOE 
giving financial advantages. The third way is through the combination of 
the trade remedies proposals, i.e., proposals regarding privatization, 
benchmark and specificity to solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial 
advantages, and the competition rules proposal to solve the problem of 
giving financial advantages. 
E. This Article’s Contribution Compared to Other Approaches 
This Article’s contribution to current academic literature and legal 
practice is explained as follows. This article exams the financial advantages 
in the context of SOEs from two dimensions, i.e., one is that SOEs give 
financial advantages, and the other is that SOEs receive financial 
advantages. The proposal suggested in this article is also made within this 
framework as identified in the above section. 
1. PTAs 
In respect of the comparison with SOE rules and development in 
preferential trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 
particular, proposals made here, although have some similarities with the 
TPP, differ from what was proposed in the TPP to some extent. In the TPP 
negotiations, there were proposals from its members about disciplines on 
SOEs receiving various advantages.86 Ultimately, the TPP was concluded 
with a chapter on SOEs.87 This chapter has provisions regarding non-
commercial assistance to SOEs or given by SOEs; obligations imposed on 
SOEs’ behavior, such as non-discriminatory treatment and the requirement 
to act in light of commercial considerations; transparency of SOEs; 
designated monopolies, particularly state monopolies; and various 
exceptions and long transitional periods. These rules were drafted with an 
eye on Chinese SOEs although China was not a party to the TPP 
                                                          
 86 The U.S.’s proposals and position can be found in State-Owned Enterprises and 
Competition Policy, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-
chapter-chapter-negotiating-7; For a general discussion about SOEs in the context of TPP 
Agreement Negotiations, see Tsuyoshi Kawase, Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and 
Rulemaking to Regulate Stat-Owned Enterprises, VOXEU.ORG (Jul. 19, 2014), http://voxeu.
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negotiations.88 The United States also wants to incorporate detailed SOEs 
rules in future FTAs as well. For instance, the United States announced its 
intent to renegotiate the NAFTA, and listed objectives for this 
renegotiation.89 Among many things, one objective in the list concerns 
state-owned and controlled enterprises, including the definition of SOEs, 
ensuring the behavior of SOEs accords with non-discriminatory treatment 
and with the requirement to make decisions based on commercial 
considerations, ensuring additional subsidy disciplines on SOEs, 
transparency requirements, overcoming evidentiary problems associated 
with litigation on SOEs, etc.90 
“Vietnam has become the EU’s second biggest trading partner in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations after Singapore and ahead of 
Malaysia.”91 EU and Vietnam announced that they have agreed on the final 
text for the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on June 2018, which 
is to be signed in 2018.92 There is a Chapter called “State Owned 
Enterprises, Enterprises Granted Speical Rights, or Privileges and 
Monopolies” in the draft of the EU-Vietnam FTA. It basically requires 
SOEs to behave according to non-discrimination principle and based on 
commercial considerations. The subsidies rules are embedded in the 
Chapter of “Competition Policy”, which provides the exception of “public 
policy objective” for providing subsidies. However, it doesn’t have 
provisions specifically regarding SOEs giving or receiving non-commercial 
advantages. The wording of the subsidies rules and SOE rules in the EU-
Vietnam FTA is similar to that in the TPP except for the fact that the EU-
Vietnam FTA has more exceptions.93 
Negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement between the EU and 
Malaysia were launched in 2010 and pub on hold after seven rounds in 
2012 at the request of Malaysia. A stocktaking exercise took place in 2016-
17 to assess the prospect to presume negotiations. In the aftermath of the 
                                                          
 88 Keith Bradsher, International Business: Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Potential Impact 
Weighed in Asia and U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/
business/international/trans-pacific-partnerships-potential-impact-weighed-in-asia-and-us.
html?_r=0 ; Tuong Lai, What Vietnam Must Now Do, N.Y. TIMES (The Opinion Pages), 
translated by Nguyen Trung Truc from the Vietnamese, Apr. 6, 2015. http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/04/07/opinion/what-vietnam-must-now-do.html. 
 89 See USTR: Trump Administration Announces Intent to Renegotiate the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, USTR.Gov., https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2017/may/ustr-trump-administration-announces. 
 90 See Summary of Objective for the NAFTA Renegotiation, Jul. 17, 2017, USTR.GOV, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf; Although 
Article 1503 of NAFTA touches on SOEs, it leaves much to the hand of the WTO rules. The 
TPP Agreement may divert some attention from the WTO to elsewhere. 
 91 European Commission, EU and Vietnam Finalize Trade and Investment Discussion, 
26 June 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1875 
 92 Id. 
 93 EU-Vietnam Trade and Investment Agreements, Annex 10-a. 
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general elections in Malaysia in May this year [2018], the new government 
has yet to take a position on the possible resumption of negotiations.94 
It is expected that a FTA, if it is to be concluded, between EU and 
Malaysia, will be similar to the EU-Vietnam FTA. In addition, the 
negotiation of EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has been 
finalized in December 2017. Chapter 12 of EU-Japan EPA has subsidies 
rules, which refer to the SCM Agreement for the definition of “subsidies”. 
It also has exceptions for public policy objective. Nevertheless, exceptions 
here are much fewer than that in the EU-Vietnam FTA. Provisions relating 
to SOEs are provided in Chapter 14 of the EU-Japan EPA. 
The competition rules proposal suggested here were inspired by what 
was drafted in the TPP as well as other PTAs mentioned above to the extent 
that the author’s proposals suggest WTO incorporating a provision such as 
Article 17.6 of the TPP, and hence prohibit SOEs from giving financial 
advantages. Nevertheless, the author suggested one more phrase of “distort 
or threaten competition” to be added given that it captures more situations 
and cases than the phrase of “cause adverse effects to another state’s 
interests” as explained in the above section. Second, the TPP proposed 
directly prohibiting SOEs from receiving non-commercial assistance from 
SOEs, state enterprises and states in its Article 17.6. In contrast, the 
author’s proposal to solve the problem of SOEs receiving financial 
advantages is through trade remedy rules, i.e., slight alteration of current 
trade remedy rules regarding benchmark and specificity in the context of 
SOEs. Third, to solve the problem of SOEs giving financial advantages, the 
author also proposes modification of current definition of “public body” to 
accomodate entities that are under the meaningful control of the 
government, and with monopolistic or dominant market power, as well as 
the trade rules proposals that SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or 
exclusive rights would be obligated not to give financial advantages to 
other SOEs due to the obligation of making decisions solely based on 
commercial considerations. The distinctive features of the author’s 
proposals also lie in the fact that the author focus on SOEs with monopolies 
and exclusive rights, or SOEs with dominant market power, which are more 
of concern, rather than every tiny SOE. 
The authors’ proposals are better in a political sense that states with 
large presence of SOEs are reluctant to accept rules that directly prohibit 
SOEs from receiving financial advantages. Alternatively, slight alteration of 
current trade remedies rules could be potentially acceptable to these states. 
In addition, rules that capture every SOEs is not politically favored by 
states that have lots of SOEs. On the other hand, it is only those SOEs that 
have monopolies or exclusive rights, or dominant market power that would 
cause concern in need of being addressed. A small and tiny SOE is not a big 
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concern since it won’t negatively affect market which is competitive. 
2. Other Proposals 
In respect of engaging in discussion with other academic articles on 
SOEs, explanations will be given in terms of the difference from current 
literation, whether they support the author’s position or differ from it, and if 
so, why the author’s approach is better. 
Regarding SOEs as recipients of financial advantages, the literature on 
SOEs recognized that the receipt of advantages by SOEs is a problem, but 
most legal analyses were about enterprises receiving advantages from 
governments in general, without a further distinction between receipts of 
advantages by SOEs and receipts of advantages by POEs.95 They pointed 
out the severe nature of the problem and briefly outlined the relevant rules 
covering international trade, investment and competition.96 But 
recommendations were merely general. For instance, the newest and latest 
literature,97 relying on the TPP Agreement and FTAs signed by the U.S., 
put forth proposals of disciplining SOEs in general from a norm 
development perspective. Taking another example, other articles suggested 
special rules specifically tailored to SOEs with respect to five elements for 
the purpose of regulation. The five elements are i) a clear definition and 
scope of SOEs; ii) clear general obligations and rights; iii) specific 
disciplines on trade-distortive practices by SOEs and specific exceptions; 
iv) provisions to improve transparency; and v) rules regarding 
enforceability and dispute settlement.98 In contrast, the author’s analysis 
focuses on SOEs in particular in the context of financial advantages. The 
author makes proposals from two dimensions, one is to tackle the problem 
of SOEs giving financial advantages, and the other is to address the 
problem of SOE receiving advantages. For that purpose, this article 
analyses legal problems from the two perspectives above, by looking at the 
issue of SOEs as givers as well as upstream subsidies in the context of 
SOEs, and the issue of SOEs as receivers that poses extra challenges to the 
legal analyses of “benchmark” “specificity” and “privatization”. The goals 
that are pursued by other articles and scholars are similar to the author, 
which is to discipline SOEs, particularly the uncompetitive advantage. 
                                                          
 95 Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroidis. A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue 
Industrial Policy And Renewable Energy: The Case For Redrafting The Subsidies 
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Nevertheless, the author’s proposals can achieve goals in a feasible way 
from a political perspective. It is in part due to the fact that the author’s 
proposals are more indirect, rather than directly targeting SOEs in general. 
Countries with SOEs are more acceptable to those indirect proposals, such 
as proposals are framed in the specific context of subsidies. 
In addition, the author’s proposals draw much attention to the elements 
of “monopolistic or dominant market power”. For instance, regarding 
“benchmark” in the context of subsidies, the author suggests a refutable 
presumption that the fact that the SOEs are the predominant suppliers 
establishes that there is price distortion, and hence it justifies an alternative 
benchmark. With respect to the element of “specificity” in the context of 
subsidies, the author suggests a rebuttable presumption rule that financial 
advantages granted to SOEs that are monopolistic or dominant in the 
industry or enjoy exclusive rights to the exclusion of POEs, are deemed to 
be specific unless evidence to the contrary can be proved. The possibility of 
realizing such proposals are also analyzed in the section above. 
Regarding SOEs as givers of financial advantages, recent literature 
analyses whether SOEs are public bodies or not, the implications of 
different standards of “public bodies” for Chinese SOEs,99 criticizes the 
method of interpretation by the AB at the WTO regarding the term “public 
body” and its flaws, and suggests preference for majority ownership criteria 
in finding a public body in the context of subsidies.100 In contrast, after 
pushing the current WTO rules to their limit, and analyzing whether 
different approaches might be utilized within the WTO rules to solve the 
problem of SOEs giving advantages to others, the author suggests a novel 
definition of the phrase “public body” by focusing on combining elements 
of “under meaningful control of the government” and “monopolistic power, 
exclusive rights or dominant market power”. The proposal has its potential 
to be realized in practice given that it is sort of in a middle position between 
the “government control” standard and the “government vested authority” 
standard that have been discussed in WTO jurisprudence so far. Second, the 
factor of “meaningful control” and the factor relating to “market status”, 
such as “monopolies, exclusive rights or dominant market power” do not go 
too far away from the latest jurisprudence of panels and AB, and hence, 
much controversy won’t be expected to arise. 
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SOEs receive more financial advantages and often act as givers of 
financial advantages, posing challenges to current WTO rules. After 
pushing current rules to its limits by different approaches, these challenging 
issues are not resolved yet. 
The author recommends trade remedy proposals to treat as public 
bodies those SOEs who are under the government’s meaningful control and 
are given monopolies or exclusive rights or dominant positions in a 
particular industry within the meaning of the SCM Agreement; 
recommends to treat the benefits obtained prior to privatization as not 
extinguished even if the privatization is at arm’s length and for fair-market 
value; recommends that it is refutably presumed there is price distortion if a 
government/SOEs is/are the predominant supplier(s); recommends with a 
rebuttable presumption rule that financial advantages granted to those SOEs 
are deemed to be specific unless evidence to the contrary can be proved; 
recommends trade rules proposals to expand the coverage of GATT Article 
XVII to all SOEs with all kinds of monopolies and exclusive rights, and 
hence the obligation of making decisions solely based on commercial 
considerations in GATT Article XVII:1(b) can be applied to all SOEs with 
different kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights; recommends competition 
elements proposals to prohibit SOEs from giving financial advantages to 
others, particularly SOEs, to the extent that such behavior affect or distorts 
competition, by adding competition elements to current WTO rules. A 
combination of trade remedies proposals, trade rules proposals, and the 
competition rules proposal can solve the problems identified in this article. 
By comparison with current SOE rules and development in preferential 
trade agreement, such as TPP draft, the ongoing NAFTA negotiations as 
well as the United States’ free trade agreements, and after encountering 
with current other academic articles, the author concludes that the legal 
analyses and proposals made in this article are distinctive and novel with 
large potential to be realized in terms of political willingness and legal 
techniques. 
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